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The Fulfillment of 3DUWLHV¶Election Pledges: A Comparative Study on the Impact of 
Power Sharing  
 
Why are some parties more likely than others to keep the promises they made during 
previous election campaigns? This study provides the first comparative analysis that 
addresses this question with common definitions of pledges and fulfillment.  We study the 
fulfillment of 18,743 pledges made in 54 election campaigns in 12 countries. We find high 
levels of pledge fulfillment for most parties that enter the government executive, and 
substantially lower levels for parties that do not. The findings challenge the common view 
of parties as promise breakers. The degree to which governing parties share power 
affects pledge fulfillment, with parties in single-party executives, both with and without 
legislative majorities, having the highest fulfillment rates. Within coalition governments, 
the likelihood of pledge fulfillment depends on whether the party receives the chief 
executive post and whether another governing party made a similar pledge, but not on 
the ideological range of the coalition.  
 
Word count (main text, notes, references and table and figure headings): 9,438. 
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The fulfillment of election pledges is highly relevant to the theory and practice of 
representative democracy. If parties channel societal demands into government policies 
effectively, there should be a substantial level of congruence between the policy content 
of their election programs or manifestos and subsequent government policies. A strong 
program-to-policy linkage is central to the mandate theory of democracy and the 
responsible party model (Downs 1957; Klingemann, Hofferbert and Budge 1994; Powell 
2000; McDonald and Budge 2015). )RU0DQVEULGJH³WKHLGHDWKDWGXULQJ
campaigns representatives made promises to constituents, which they then kept or failed 
to NHHS´LVWKHIRFXVRIWKHWUDGLWLRQDOPRGHORIGHPRFUDWLFUHSUHVHQWDWLRQDOVRNQRZQDV
³SURPLVVRU\UHSUHVHQWDWLRQ´ 
This topic also features prominently in political debate around the world. 
Politicians often claim to hold a mandate to carry out their election platforms (Grossback, 
Peterson and Stimson 2005). PDUWLHV¶HOHFWLRQSURJUDPVDQGVSHFLILFHOHFWLRQSOHGJHV
receive considerable media attention (Krukones 1984). The popular narrative is generally 
negative. In 31 of the 33 countries studied in an international survey, more respondents 
disagreed than agreed with the statement: ³3HRSOHZHHOHFWDV03VWU\WRNHHSWKH
SURPLVHVWKH\KDYHPDGHGXULQJWKHHOHFWLRQ´ (ISSP 2008; see also Naurin 2011; 
Thomson 2011). Such skeptical views are by no means confined to uninformed mass 
opinion. Manin (1997, 180) writes³HYHQDVVXPLQJWKDWYRWHUVFKRRVHWRSD\VRPH
DWWHQWLRQWRWKHFDQGLGDWHV¶SURPLVHVWKH\NQRZRUVKRXOGNQRZWKDWWKHFUHGLELOLW\RI
those promises is an open question. It is not reasonable on their part to suppose that 
FDQGLGDWHVZLOOQHFHVVDULO\KRQRUWKHLUFRPPLWPHQWV´2XUUHVHDUFKH[DPLQHVZKHWKHU
and when such views reflect the reality of politics. 
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3DUWLHV¶HOHFWLRQSURJUDPVDQGWKHSROLF\SOHGJHVWKH\FRQWDLQ also have 
important intra and inter-party functions. Party leaders must respond to and represent 
factions to maintain internal support (Thomassen 1994, 256-8). Factions view their 
parties as vehicles through which they can attain their political goals, and one way in 
which this can be done is to secure the SDUW\¶V commitment to specific policies in its 
election pledges. In the absence of detailed election programs, party leaders may be 
undisciplined. With reference to Latin American parties, Mainwaring and Scully (1995, 
QRWH³8QIHttered by party platforms, [political leaders] make policy choices that tend 
to be short-term and erratic. They are more prone to demagoguery and populism, both of 
ZKLFKKDYHGHOHWHULRXVHIIHFWVRQGHPRFUDF\´ 
 The inter-party function of election pledges is relevant in systems where power 
sharing is the norm. Coalition governments are typically formed after negotiations 
between prospective governing parties EDVHGRQHDFKSDUW\¶VHOHFWLRQSURJUDP6WU¡P
0OOHUDQG%HUJPDQ3DUWLHV¶FDPSDLJQSURPLVHV are relevant to government 
formation since they are clear statements of the policy positions with which parties enter 
these negotiations,QFRDOLWLRQJRYHUQPHQWVWKHH[WHQWWRZKLFKHDFKJRYHUQLQJSDUW\¶V
policy proposals are turned into policies is a mark of its relative power in the coalition 
(Laver and Shepsle 1996, 42). 
 Our research on the fulfillment of election pledges complements the saliency 
approach to the mandate model, in which scholars focus on the relative emphases parties 
place on different policy themes (Robertson 1976; Budge, Robertson and Hearl 1987; 
Klingeman, Hofferbert and Budge 1994). The saliency approach investigates the 
program-to-SROLF\OLQNDJHE\H[DPLQLQJWKHDVVRFLDWLRQEHWZHHQSDUWLHV¶HPSKDVHVRI
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various policy themes in their programs and subsequent government spending in related 
policy areas. Similarly, Sulkin (2009) examined issue emphases in US Congressional 
FDQGLGDWHV¶FDPSDLJQDSSHDOVDQGIRXQGWKDWWKHVHcorrelate with relevant legislative 
activity once in office. The pledge approach is distinct from the saliency approach in that 
it features WKHVSHFLILFSROLF\FRQWHQWVRISDUWLHV¶HOHFWRUDODSSHDOVZKLFKDOORZVDPRUH
fine-grained analysis of the program-to-policy linkage. 
 The research approach we use is quite straightforward: we identify pledges in 
party programs and evaluate the extent to which these pledges were fulfilled (for reviews 
of this approach and comparisons to other approaches see Royed 1996; Mansergh and 
Thomson 2007; Naurin 2014). ElectiRQSOHGJHVDUHFRPPLWPHQWVLQSDUWLHV¶programs to 
carry out certain policies or achieve certain outcomes. These commitments are 
sufficiently detailed for researchers to test whether or not they were fulfilled after the 
election. In one of the earliest pledge studies, Pomper (1968; Pomper and Lederman 
1980) examined the fulfillment of election pledges made by US parties. Our study takes 
the pledge approach forward with the first truly comparative analysis of pledge 
fulfillment across 12 countries: Austria, Bulgaria, Canada, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States. Our 
data come from a comparative project in which scholars have worked to develop 
common definitions, test the reliability of different approaches, and produce data that are 
comparable. We merge some previously analyzed data (recoded so that they use a 
common definition of pledge) along with thousands of new pledges not previously 
analyzed. Our integrated analysis allows us to make comparable assessments of pledge 
fulfillment in different institutional and economic contexts and to control for pledge 
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characteristics when examining variation in fulfillment. We find that some governing 
parties fulfill high percentages of their previous election pledges, but also that there is 
substantial variation in pledge fulfilment. Our main focus is on the impact of power-
sharing arrangements on pledge fulfillment. One of our main findings is that parties in 
single-party executives, both with and without legislative majorities, are more likely to 
fulfill their pledges than parties in coalitions. 
 
Hypotheses 
We begin the analysis by addressing the main descriptive question raised by mandate 
theory: to what extent do parties fulfill their election pledges? We also examine whether 
there is a stronger program-to-policy linkage for governing parties than for opposition 
parties. :HUHIHUWRDSDUW\DVD³JRYHUQLQJSDUW\´LILWKHOGH[HFXWLYHRIILFHDIWHUWKH
HOHFWLRQDQGDQ³RSSRVLWLRQSDUW\´LILWGLGQRWregardless of whether the party was in 
power during the election campaign in which it made the pledge. The fulfillment of 
RSSRVLWLRQSDUWLHV¶SOHGJHVFDQEHH[SODLQHGDWOHDVWLQSDUWE\WKHIDFWWKDWJRYHUQLQJ
parties made the same or similar pledges on some issues, or that the pledges concerned 
uncontentious policies that any government would enact. Governing parties may also 
enact and take credit for popular policies proposed by their opponents.  
 Our main focus is the impact of power-sharing arrangements on the fulfillment of 
pledges made by governing parties. Single-party executives with legislative majorities are 
a defining characteristic of political systems in prominent theories of institutions. 
According to LijphaUW¶VLQIOXHQWLDOW\SRORJ\, winner-takes-all majoritarian 
systems usually have single-party majority executives, while consensus democracies in 
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which power is dispersed more widely, generally have minority governments and 
coalitions. For Powell and Whitten (1993) single-party majority governments make for 
greater clarity of responsibility, because this gives a single party most control over 
policymaking. Their argument concerning clarity of responsibility refers specifically to 
the contexts in which voters hold governments to account for variation in economic 
performance. However, the idea that single-party majority governments have most 
control over economic policies and performance is of obvious relevance to partisan 
control in other policy areas. Our main hypothesis with respect to power sharing is the 
following: 
H1: Parties that form single-party executives with legislative majorities are more likely 
to fulfill their election pledges than parties in governments that are compelled to share 
power with other parties. 
Governments in which parties are compelled to share power are single-party minority 
governments, majority coalitions and minority coalitions. Our main analyses control for 
government duration, which tends to be shorter on average for coalitions and minority 
governments (Saalfeld 2013).  
On balance we expect single-party status to matter more than majority status. 
Previous research suggests that difference between governments with and without 
legislative majorities may not be large. 0D\KHZ¶VUHVHDUFKon the US indicates 
that divided governments, in which the executive party does not control a legislative 
majority in one or both houses, can be as productive as those in which a single party 
controls both branches. Strøm (1990) also finds that minority governments, which are 
common in many small European countries, work effectively.  
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We examine several factors that may affect pledge fulfillment in minority 
governments, the first of which is  the presence of support agreements with opposition 
parties. Strøm (1990, 108-9) describes minority governments with support agreements as 
majority governments in disguise, and defines genuine minority governments as those 
that seek support for each new initiative on an ad hoc basis. Second, single-party minority 
governments that control the median legislator are likely to be stronger than those that do 
not. &URPEH]¶VPRGHOof government formation predicts that as the largest party 
becomes more centrally located and larger, although still holding less than 50 percent of 
legislative seats, the likelihood of a single-party minority government increases. 
Moreover, when these conGLWLRQVDUHPHW&URPEH]¶VPRGHOVXJJHVWVWKDWPLQRULW\VWDWXV
is a sign of strength rather than weakness. Third, legislative procedures such as 
investiture rules define the way in which minority governments form. While there are 
many differences among investiture rules, it is common to distinguish between positive 
and negative rules (Rasch, Martin and Cheibub 2015). Under positive investiture rules, 
prospective governments must win the support of simple or absolute majorities in order 
to take office. Under negative rules by contrast, support is assumed to exist unless a 
legislative vote, usually by absolute majority, proves otherwise. Negative investiture 
rules reduce the need for prospective minority governments to make bargains with 
opposition parties in order to garner legislative majorities for their programs for 
government, and such bargains may dilute SDUWLHV¶ campaign commitments. Nonetheless, 
even in the presence of negative investiture rules, minority governments still need to win 
majorities for the specific bills they propose, which puts them in a weaker position 
compared to majority governments. 
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 The theory of veto players is relevant to the expectation that governing parties in 
coalitions are less likely to fulfill their election pledges. Tsebelis (2002) argues that 
policies tend to be more stable in systems with more veto players who have greater 
ideological diversity among them. The ideological range of parties in governing 
coalitions is commonly used as a measure of the heterogeneity of the set of relevant veto 
players (e.g. Tsebelis and Chang 2004). Since most election pledges concern proposals to 
bring about change, veto players theory could be taken to imply that pledge fulfillment is 
lower in coalitions with more parties and with parties that span a wider ideological range.  
 It is however questionable whether veto players theory implies hypotheses 
regarding effect of the ideological range of coalitions on pledge fulfillment, and we 
therefore simply include this variable as a control. McGann and Latner (2013, 827) point 
out that governing parties are not veto players according to the accepted definition of this 
term as members of every possible winning coalition; instead, governing parties are 
simply members of the winning coalition that happens to form. One FRDOLWLRQPHPEHU¶V
DWWHPSWWREORFNFKDQJHLQWKHIRUPRIWKHIXOILOOPHQWRILWVSDUWQHU¶VHOHFWLRQSOHGJHV
may not result in non-fulfillment, but rather in the formation of a new government. 
Furthermore, the link between the spatial model of politics and election pledges may not 
be a simple one. Large ideological distances need not imply low levels of pledge 
fulfillment. The saliency theory of party competition (Robertson 1976; Budge, Robertson 
and Hearl 1987) states that ideologically distant parties tend to focus on ± and by 
implication make pledges on - different issues or themes. This makes it theoretically 
possible for all parties in ideologically diverse coalitions to have high levels of pledge 
fulfillment.  
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Within governing coalitions, we expect the party of the chief executive or prime 
minister to have an advantage in terms of pledge fulfillment. According to models of 
coalition formation and policymaking in coalitions, the party of the chief executive has 
greater influence over policy than does its junior coalition partner(s). Several models 
focus on the proposal power of the party selected to initiate government formation, which 
puts them in a strong position relative to other coalition members (Austen-Smith and 
Banks 1988; Baron 1991; Diermeier and Feddersen 1998). The party that leads the 
process of coalition formation is generally the largest party that goes on to control the 
chief executive. For Huber (1996), the vote of confidence procedure enables the prime 
ministerial party to raise the stakes in any legislative vote by making it a vote of 
confidence in the government, thereby limiting the extent to which other coalition parties 
influence policies. Some models show hoZWKHSULPHPLQLVWHU¶VSDUW\FDQVKDSHpolicies 
by reconfiguring the jurisdictions of ministerial portfolios (Thies 2001; Dewan and 
Hortala-Vallve 2011).  
Within coalitions, we also expect that pledges are more likely to be fulfilled if the 
party that made them went on to hold the relevant ministerial portfolio. In Laver and 
6KHSVOH¶VPRGHORIFRDOLWLRQSROLF\PDNLQJSDUWLHVKDYHOLWWOHVD\LQSROLF\DUHDV
over which they do not receive ministerial control. According to this model, parties will 
be persuaded to participate in a coalition only if they believe it is credible in terms of 
policy, and the distribution of ministerial portfolios provides such credibility. In addition, 
models of ministerial drift posit that ministers may be tempted to pursue initiatives that 
differ from theLUJRYHUQPHQW¶VFRPPRQSODWIRUP (Huber and Shipan 2002, 185; Martin 
and Vanberg 2004, 15-6). There are, however, other models of coalition policymaking in 
 11 
which policymaking is a process of compromise between coalition partners and 
ministerial autonomy is constrained (Warwick 1999; Dunleavy and Bastow 2001). 
Our hypotheses regarding the fulfillment of pledges by parties within coalitions 
are the following: 
H2a: In coalition governments, parties that receive the prime ministership are more 
likely to fulfill their election pledges than other coalition members. 
H2b: In coalition governments, a pledge is more likely to be fulfilled if the party that 
made it receives the relevant portfolio. 
 The power-sharing arrangements we have considered so far, particularly the 
comparison of single-party majority governments with other government types, are part 
of a broader set of institutional constraints on governing parties. Different theoretical 
approaches highlight different institutional features in addition to power-sharing 
arrangements within executives/LMSKDUW¶V(1999) typology also includes federalism, 
bicameralism, judicial review and central bank independence. Powell and WhLWWHQ¶V
(1993) index of clarity of responsibility also includes the power of opposition parties in 
legislative committees, party cohesion and bicameralism. 0F*DQQDQG/DWQHU¶V (2013) 
theory incorporates the proportionality of the electoral system and an index of 
characteristics that constrain governments including bicameralism, federalism, 
presidentialism and referenda. A common thread running through these theories is that it 
is harder for governments to get things done in the face of more institutional constraints. 
Competing centers of power, or competitive veto points in the language of veto players 
theory, make it more difficult to realize policy change. They in effect raise the threshold 
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of support required for a decision to be taken. In terms of pledge fulfillment this leads to 
the following expectation: 
H3: Governing parties that are subject to fewer institutional constraints are more likely 
to fulfill their election pledges. 
Given the 12 countries we include in the present study, we focus on (semi-) 
presidentialism, bicameralism, federalism and EU membership as possible constraints on 
governing parties that reduce the likelihood of pledge fulfillment.  
 In addition to the degree of government and institutional control, which are our 
main concerns, we expect other factors to matter and control for these other variables. 
Pledges are more likely to be redeemed when governing parties have more resources in 
terms of finances and time. Economic conditions are among the most important factors in 
explaining variation in public policy outputs (Huber and Stephens 2001). Growth 
provides government revenues, which are directly relevant to fulfilling pledges that 
increase expenditure or cut taxes, and indirectly relevant to fulfilling regulatory 
measures, which often have implications for the allocation of government personnel. Like 
revenue, time is a resource that enhances the ability of governments to get things done; 
thus, when governments are short in duration, we anticipate lower rates of pledge 
fulfillment. 
 Characteristics of the pledges themselves and the programs in which they are 
made may also affect the likelihood of fulfillment. We control for the total numbers of 
pledges made by the party, but do not formulate a specific expectation about the direction 
of the effect. On the one hand, it might be more difficult to fulfill more pledges than 
fewer. On the other hand, a larger number of pledges may indicate that the party is more 
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focused on pledges as part of its electoral and government strategy, which may mean a 
higher likelihood of fulfillment. We also control for incumbency and government 
experience by categorizing parties into three groups according to their status during the 
election campaign in which they made the pledges we examine: incumbents, opposition 
parties with prior governing experience, and oppositions parties without prior governing 
experience. We expect that pledges by incumbents are most likely to be fulfilled, while 
pledges by opposition parties with no prior governing experience are least likely to be 
fulfilled if they enter office. By identifying parties without governing experience, we 
consider SDUWLHV¶ expectations regarding the likelihood they will enter government office. 
Parties without prior governing experience may not expect to enter government and 
therefore have to implement their pledges, which may make them more inclined to 
formulate pledges that are difficult to fulfill.  
Characteristics of pledges themselves may matter too. Our hypotheses refer to 
pledges that involve changes to the status quo. In a minority of pledges, parties promise 
to maintain the status quo on particular issues, and we analyze the fulfillment of these 
pledges separately, anticipating a high rate of fulfillment given the incrementalism of 
policymaking in large governments. We also explore whether pledges of different types, 
such as pledges to cut taxes or expand programs, differ significantly in terms of their 
likelihood of being fulfilled.  
The relations among pledges made by different parties should also be considered, 
particularly when power-sharing arrangements compel parties to cooperate with others.  
We expect WKDWJRYHUQLQJSDUWLHV¶SOHGJHVDUHPRUHOLNHO\WREHIXOILOOHGLIRWKHUSDUWLHV
also made the same or similar pledges. Our models also control for the fact that in six of 
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the 54 election campaigns we study, at least some of the pledges appeared in programs 
written by pre-election coalitions of parties. We expect that pledges made by pre-election 
coalitions are more likely to be fulfilled than pledges made by separate parties that enter 
coalitions. 
It may be argued that parties consider the future institutional environment they 
expect to encounter when making pledges, with parties that expect more obstacles 
making more modest pledges. This could nullify the observable effects of institutions on 
fulfillment; to the extent that we do find institutional effects, these may be underestimates 
of the true magnitude of these effects. There are two other responses to this concern 
regarding endogeneity. First, rational parties have good reason to make pledges they 
know they may not be able to keep. Pledges that have a low likelihood of being fulfilled 
may create negotiating space in coalition or legislative negotiations. Such pledges also 
serve to signal commitment to key supporters. Second, the qualitative evidence makes us 
skeptical of the idea that parties with governing experience tailor their pledges according 
to the probability of successful fulfillment. Small parties do not issue more modest 
election platforms than large parties just because they are less likely to govern alone; 
instead, they set out what they would ideally do if it were up to them. The US case gives 
many examples of the fact that parties do not necessarily tailor their pledges to 
foreseeable constraints. Republican Party platforms regularly pledge to enact a 
constitutional amendment banning abortion, while this is unlikely to be fulfilled without 
winning both the presidency and unrealistically large majorities in both houses.  
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Research Design 
Case selection 
We have assembled the largest available dataset to date on pledge fulfillment, which 
includes information on 18,743 pledges made by parties prior to the formation of 54 
governments in 12 countries. The governments included are representative in that they 
offer variation in the four types of executive government: 1) single-party executives with 
legislative majorities; 2) single-party executives with legislative minorities; 3) coalition-
based executives with legislative majorities; and 4) coalition-based executives with 
legislative minorities (Table 1). Each of the governments included in our study lasted at 
least 12 months and was the first government to take office after the previous election.1 
                                                     
1 The countries and time periods covered included several short-lived governments of less 
than 12 months duration, which we do not examine here, but are considered in some 
detail in country-specific studies. While these cases are interesting in their own right, we 
do not believe they provide much insight into the effects of the main power-sharing 
arrangements in which we are interested in this study. Rather, they are more relevant to 
the tribulations of governing in times of transition or crisis. Most of the short-lived 
governments are from Bulgaria. We excluded two three-month caretaker governments in 
Bulgaria (1994 and 1997), which were formed more than a year after elections. There 
were also four Bulgarian non-caretaker governments excluded from the early 1990s. This 
was a period of transition and democratic consolidation in Bulgaria. We also excluded 
two minority governments in Ireland from the early 1980s, one of which was unusual in 
that the party that entered government only made two election pledges, neither of which 
was particularly salient. 
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The selection of these countries was a consequence of researchers working independently 
on the countries on which they have specialist knowledge and interest, and subsequently 
coordinating their efforts to make comparisons possible.  
[Table 1 about here] 
For the purposes of comparison we treat US governments as cases of single-party 
executive government with or without legislative majorities. Divided governments in the 
US have more in common with single-party minority governments than with coalition 
governments; US presidents must negotiate with the other main party in the legislature on 
each piece of legislation, as opposed to coalition governments, which typically have 
ongoing pre-negotiated compromises on a range of issues. We recognize, however, that 
these US governments may differ from the other single-party executives included, and so 
we explore whether our key findings differ when excluding the US from the analysis, 
which they do not (Supporting Information). 
There is some variation among the country studies in the policy areas included as 
well as the time-periods covered, and we include controls and tests to check that this does 
not drive our main findings. Most country studies include all policy areas for all main 
parties, while a few focus on a broad subset of socioeconomic policy for all or some 
parties. The data for the Netherlands and Spain and for one of the Irish governments 
include only socioeconomic policy.  We also control for the time-period in which each 
pledge was made with a categorical variable for the decade since we do not expect time 
to have a linear effect.  
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Measurement 
There are two steps to the pledge-testing approach: first, identifying pledges in election 
manifestos, and second, testing fulfillment. For a statement to qualify as a pledge, it must 
contain language indicating commitment to some future action or outcome. Pledges 
LQFOXGHERWKILUPFRPPLWPHQWVXFKDV³ZHZLOO´RU³ZHSURPLVHWR´as well as more 
VRIWO\GHVFULEHGLQWHQWLRQVXFKDV³ZHVXSSRUW´RU³ZHIDYRU´DVORQJDVSDUWLHVLQGLFDWH
that they support the action or outcome referred to unequivocally. What determines 
whether a statement qualifies as a pledge is the testability of the action or outcome to 
which the party is committing itself. A pledge is a statement committing a party to an 
action or outcome that is testable: i.e. we can gather evidence and make an argument that 
the action or outcome was either accomplished or not. Many statements that begin with 
hard commitment language would be considered rhetoric, not pledges, because they do 
not meet the testability criteria²IRUH[DPSOH³ZHZLOOHQVXUHWKDWRXUJRYHUQPHQWVKRZV
UHVSHFWIRUIDPLOLHV´RU³ZHVXSSRUWIDLUWUHDWPHQWIRUDOO´We define a pledge as a 
statement committing a party to one specific action or outcome that can be clearly 
determined to have occurred or not. The Supporting Information provides an extensive 
discussion of the conceptual issues associated with the definition of pledges, as well as 
the different approaches that scholars within our group used before settling on this 
common denominator for the purposes of comparative research.  
Reliability tests were conducted on the identification of election pledges. For the 
specific definition used here, nine researchers independently coded part of the 2008 
Canadian Conservative Party manifesto. The reliability for each pair of coders was 
computed as x/n, where x is the number of statements that both coders identified as 
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pledges and n is the total number of statements identified as pledges by at least one of the 
nine coders. The nine coders identified a total of 99 pledges in the manifesto with an 
average paired reliability of 74 percent. Separate reliability tests were carried out within 
several country studies with higher levels of agreement between coders: Ireland (80 
percent), Netherlands (88 percent), Spain (87 percent), Sweden (94 percent), the US and 
UK (together 84 percent). The reliability tests in the studies of Ireland, the Netherlands 
and Spain and Sweden used the same narrow definition of pledges as that used here, 
while the studies of the US and the UK used a broader definition. 
 We also conducted a reliability test on the categorization of pledges as ³IXOO\´, 
³SDUWLDOO\´, or ³QRW´IXOILOOHG'HSHQGLQJRQWKHQDWXUHRIWKHDFWLRQRURXWFRPHUHIHUUHG
to in the pledge, a variety of sources were consulted to test fulfillment, including 
legislation, ministerial decrees, budgetary or other data, and secondary sources. A total of 
40 pledges were randomly selected (five from eight of the countries examined here) and 
examined by seven researchers. The researcher primarily responsible for work on the 
country concerned provided the other researchers with the evidence he or she used to 
evaluate the fulfillment of each pledge without revealing his or her evaluation, and 
translated the relevant material into English if necessary. Seven researchers then 
LQGHSHQGHQWO\FDWHJRUL]HGHDFKSOHGJHDV³IXOO\´³partially´RU³QRW´IXOILOled. Across 
the 21 pairs of researchers, we found an average agreement rate of 93 percent.  
For 10 of the 12 countries selected, we have data on the three-category indicator 
of fulfillment, but work done on Italy and Spain used the dichotomous categorization of 
³QRWIXOILOOHG´DQG³DWOHDVWSDUWLDOO\IXOILOOHG´To maximize the numbers of cases, our 
multivariate analyses focus on this dichotomous indicator in all countries.  
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The analyses also include information from our coding of the characteristics of 
each pledge. We coded whether each pledge directly agreed or disagreed with a pledge 
made by one or more other parties. Our multivariate analyses count multiple mentions of 
the same or a similar pledge by different parties at the same election only once.2 We also 
distinguished between pledges to maintain the status quo, which are a small minority of 
cases, and pledges to introduce some kind of change. We exclude status quo pledges from 
the multivariate analyses, because our hypotheses are relevant to change pledges. For a 
subset of six countries we developed a more detailed categorization of pledge type, which 
distinguishes tax-cut and expansionary pledges among others, and report on this in the 
Supporting Information. 
To estimate the ideological range of each coalition government, we use measures 
of the ideological positions of each party on the Left-Right dimension formulated by 
Lowe et al. (2011), which adjust data from the Comparative Manifestos Project (Budge et 
al. 2001; Klingmeann et al. 2006) for measurement error. We take the absolute distance 
                                                     
2 In the multivariate analyses we measure the fulfillment of a pledge that was made by 
several governing parties in a coalition by assessing the pledge as it was formulated by 
the party that obtained the prime ministership or the largest of the two governing parties 
LIQHLWKHUKHOGWKHSULPHPLQLVWHUVKLS$SOHGJHLVFRGHGDV³VLPLODU´WRDQRWKHULIWKH
fulfillment of one of the pledges would mean that the other pledge was also fulfilled at 
least partially. So pledges by party A to cut the basic rate of tax from 20% to 15% and 
SDUW\%WRFXWWKDWWD[UDWHIURPWRZRXOGEHFRGHGDV³VLPLODU´HYHQWKRXJK
they are distinct promises. Very few pledges are in direct disagreement with other 
pledges, and our results are the same if these are excluded from the analysis. 
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between the two most extreme parties in the coalition as the measure of ideological 
range. We also control for the ideological distance between each party and the position of 
the party of the median legislator.  
For coalition governments, we include a control for the Herfindahl index of 
concentration based on the seat shares of each coalition member. This varies from .32 to 
1 in our sample, and becomes larger as the share of seats held by any one of the parties 
becomes larger. The measure of GDP growth uses data from the World Bank. It is the 
average growth rate over the lifetime of the government. 
 
Analysis of Pledge Fulfillment 
Election pledges refer to many substantively important policy changes. To take examples 
from three countries in our dataset, in the US the Republicans under Reagan at least 
partially fulfilled pledges to cut certain taxes, enact deregulation, and tighten eligibility 
for food stamps. At the same time, the Republicans failed to fulfill pledges to reduce 
certain other taxes, enact a youth minimum wage, and create tuition tax credits for private 
schools. Among the UK &RQVHUYDWLYH3DUW\¶VIXOILOOHGSOHGJHVwere commitments to 
reduce taxes, particularly for high earners, sell-off public housing, and privatize certain 
public sector companies. In the three-party majority coalition that that took office in the 
Netherlands in 1994, the Labour Party (PvdA) partially fulfilled a promise to raise 
welfare payments in line with wage increases in the private sector, while the Liberal 
3DUW\¶V99'SOHGJHWRIUHH]HZHOIDUHEHQHILWVDWWKHLUOHYHOVZHQWXQIXOILOOHGDV
GLGWKH'HPRFUDW¶V'SOHGJHWRUHGXFHWKHWRSUDWHRILQFRPHWD[While the 
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subsequent analyses focus on systematic variation in pledge fulfillment, we should not 
lose sight of the substantive importance of pledges to the groups they affect. 
Figure 1 shows descriptive information on pledge fulfillment in the 12 countries 
included. The first main finding is that governing parties fulfilled a clear majority of 
pledges at least partially: 59 percent (5,044 of the 8,547 pledges were fulfilled at least 
partially). There is substantial variation in levels of pledge fulfillment. The highest rate of 
fulfillment for governing parties is found in the UK, where all five governments were 
single-party governments with parliamentary majorities; the UK governing parties 
fulfilled 86 percent (494 of 575 pledges) at least partially. There are also relatively high 
rates of pledge fulfillment in the two single-party Portuguese governments. The single-
party minority governments in Sweden also fulfilled a remarkably high percentage of 
theiUFRQVWLWXHQWSDUWLHV¶SOHGJHVDWOHDVWSDUWLDOO\7 percent (112 of 129 pledges), while 
the Swedish majority coalition fulfilled a lower percentage of its pledges: 68 percent (92 
of 135 pledges). The lowest overall rates of pledge fulfillment are found in Ireland, 
Bulgaria, Austria and Italy. These governments include several short-lived coalitions, 
minority governments, and in the Austrian and Italian cases broad coalitions. Two of the 
Austrian coalition governments include the far-right populist Freedom Party, which had 
little government experience at the national level and faced ongoing internal 
disagreements, which also led to the early termination of the first cabinet. US presidential 
parties fulfilled a higher percentage of their election pledges than executive governing 
parties in most coalition systems, but less than governing parties in parliamentary 
systems where single-party governments are the norm. The aggregate figures suggest that 
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governing parties in single-party executives are more likely to fulfill their election 
pledges than parties in coalitions. 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 Figure 1 also contains information on the fulfillment of pledges made by non-
H[HFXWLYHSDUWLHV2SSRVLWLRQSDUWLHV¶SOHGJHVKDYHDUHDVRQDEOHOLNHOLKRRGRIEHLQJ
fulfilled. In Germany, for instance, 45 percent of opposition partieV¶SOHGJHVZHUH
fulfilled at least partially. Non-presidential parties in the US also saw relatively high 
percentages of their pledges fulfilled. In most periods, non-presidential parties held 
congressional majorities. In the UK, pledges made by opposition parties are less likely to 
be fulfilled, which accords with the general view of the UK as a winner-takes-all 
majoritarian system. 7KHDJJUHJDWHILJXUHVVXJJHVWWKDWRSSRVLWLRQSDUWLHV¶SOHGJHV
appear more likely to be fulfilled when they face minority governments and/or coalitions. 
The particularly high percentage of fulfillment for opposition parties facing minority 
coalitions should be treated with caution since this figure is based on pledges made by 
one Irish party in 1997. The country study of Italy does not include information on 
RSSRVLWLRQSDUWLHV¶SOHGJHV 
 The multivariate models presented in Table 2 have pledges within programs as the 
main units of analysis.3 The models include only JRYHUQLQJSDUWLHV¶SOHGJHVH[FOXGH
                                                     
3 The data have a hierarchical structure to which a multilevel model could be applied. 
There are, however, few observations at some of the higher levels (12 countries and a 
maximum of four different election programs within any of our governments), which 
makes multilevel modeling problematic. Two of the explanatory variables, Relevant 
portfolio and Agreement between coalition partners, vary within programs. 
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status quo pledges, and count pledges made by more than one governing party once, as 
described above. This accounts for the smaller number of cases in Table 2 compared to 
the total number of governing parties¶ pledges reported in Figure 1. Status quo pledges 
are a minority of pledges and are very likely to be fulfilled; of the 8,547 pledges made by 
governing parties, 755 were status quo pledges. Of these 755 pledges, 671 or 89 percent 
were at least partially fulfilled and there is little variation in the fulfillment rate across 
different types of government. While status quo pledges can be substantively important 
promises, they are qualitatively different from pledges to change the current state of 
affairs, which makes it appropriate to exclude them from the multivariate analyses.  
[Table 2 about here] 
The headline finding from Table 2 is that parties in single-party governments, 
both with and without legislative majorities, significantly outperform parties in coalitions 
on pledge fulfillment. The dependent variable in all models is whether the pledge in 
question was at least partially fulfilled (1) or not (0). Governing parties in single-party 
majority governments by definition control the chief executive, all ministries, have an 
ideological range of zero, a Herfindahl index of one and a distance of zero to the median 
legislator. Model 1 therefore excludes these variables. In Model 1 the negative 
coefficients for the variables Coalition majority and Coalition minority indicate that 
parties in these types of government are significantly less likely to fulfill their pledges 
than parties in single-party majority governments, which is the reference category. The 
coefficients for Coalition majority and Coalition minority governments are also 
significantly different from the coefficient for Single-party minority governments 
(p=.00), indicating that parties in coalitions are significantly less likely to fulfill their 
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pledges than parties in single-party minority governments. The magnitude of the effects 
of the coalition variables is also substantial. The odds ratios for Coalition majority and 
Coalition minority governments (eb of .34 and .28) indicate that the odds of pledge 
fulfillment in these types of government are 76 and 72 percent lower than for single-party 
majority governments. 
Model 1 also reveals surprisingly that parties in single-party minority 
governments are not significantly less likely to fulfill their pledges than parties in single-
party majority governments. On the contrary, governing parties in single-party minority 
governments are significantly more likely to fulfill their pledges according to Model 1, 
although this positive affect becomes insignificant in Model 2, which adds additional 
explanatory variables. The positive and significant effect also becomes insignificant 
when we exclude the duration variable from Model 1. Nonetheless, the absence of a 
significant negative effect for single-party minority governments compared to their 
majority counterparts is noteworthy. 
The single-party governments deserve further analysis, particularly with respect to 
the comparison between the 15 majority and 16 minority single-party governments. This 
analysis highlights that majority governments do not outperform minority governments, 
even those of a relatively short duration. Model 1 of Table 3 examines pledges made by 
parties that entered single-party governments and distinguishes between the 11 single-
party minority governments that lasted longer than three years and the five single-party 
minority governments that lasted less than three years. None of the 15 single-party 
majority governments lasted less than three years. Neither of the minority government 
coefficients is significant, indicating that the likelihood of pledge fulfillment for single-
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party minority governments is not significantly lower than for single-party majority 
governments. The government with the shortest duration in this model is the single-party 
minority Canadian Liberal Party government 2004-06, which lasted just over a year and 
nonetheless fulfilled 72 percent of its pledges at least partially.  
[Table 3 about here] 
With respect to these single-party minority governments, we further explored (1) 
agreements with opposition parties, (2) seat share and control of the median legislator as 
highlighted E\&URPEH]¶VPRGHODQGWKHSUHVHQFHRIQHJDWLYHLQYHVWLWXUH
rules which strengthen the executive relative to the legislature (details are in the 
Supporting Information). Agreements with opposition parties do not have a consistent 
effect on the likelihood of pledge fulfillment, although there is some evidence that the 
Spanish minority governments benefited from this arrangement. Neither seat share nor 
control of the median legislator accounts for variation in pledge fulfillment among 
minority governments. Our data exhibit relatively little variation in these variables; of the 
11 single-party minority governments outside the US, all consisted of the largest party in 
the legislature with an average of 45 percent of the legislative seats, and only one had less 
than 40 percent of seats. Of the 11 single-party minority governments outside the US, 
eight controlled the median legislator. The three that did not hold the median legislator, 
one Spanish government and two Canadian governments, did not fulfill significantly 
fewer pledges than those that did. There is some evidence that negative investiture rules 
are associated with higher rates of pledge fulfillment. Both Sweden and Portugal have 
negative investiture rules, which strengthen minority governments relative to the 
legislature, and the minority governments in Sweden and Portugal have high rates of 
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pledge fulfillment. In a multivariate analysis reported in the Supporting Information, the 
presence of a negative investiture procedure are associated with a significantly higher 
likelihood of pledge fulfillment by parties in single-party minority governments.  
We now turn to the variables Chief executive and Relevant portfolio, which take 
different values for parties in governing coalitions. Model 2 in Table 2 includes these and 
other controls. The coefficients for Coalition majority and Coalition minority remain 
negative and significant in Model 2, indicating that the likelihood of pledge fulfillment is 
significantly lower in these situations than in single-party majority governments. Both of 
the coalition coefficients differ significantly from the Single-party minority coefficient, 
but not significantly different from each other (p=.27). As expected Chief executive has a 
positive and significant coefficient in Model 2. The odds of pledge fulfillment are 85 
percent higher if the party receives the Chief executive. We do not, however, find 
significant associations between pledge fulfillment and the possession of the relevant 
ministerial post or the ideological range of governments. 
Model 2 in Table 3 is restricted to the subset of cases concerning coalitions in 
which there is variation in the occupancy of the chief executive and relevant ministries 
within each coalition.4 This model confirms the finding that holding the post of chief 
executive within coalitions has a marked and significant positive effect on the likelihood 
                                                     
4 Italy is excluded from this model because all election pledges are sourced from common 
programs of pre-election coalitions, which means there is no variation in the variables 
Chief executive or Relevant ministry. Although there were also pre-election coalitions in 
%XOJDULDDQG6ZHGHQZHDOVRKDYHSOHGJHVIURPVRPHFRDOLWLRQSDUWLHV¶LQGLYLGXDO
election platforms for those countries.  
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of pledge fulfillment. Again, holding the relevant ministerial portfolio does not appear to 
affect the likelihood of pledge fulfillment. This non-finding is contrary to the expectation 
from the model ministerial-portfolio allocation, but in line with models of coalition 
bargaining in which ministers are constrained by the compromises reached with their 
coalition partners.  
The variables Ideological range and Herfindahl index do not affect pledge 
fulfillment in coalitions according to Model 2 (Table 3). This indicates that pledge 
fulfillment is not affected by the ideological range of the coalition or the extent to which 
the relative seat shares of the coalition members are concentrated in one of the parties. 
The variable Agreement has a positive and significant coefficient, indicating that pledges 
are more likely to be fulfilled if they are supported by more than one of the coalition 
members.  
Figure 2 depicts the key findings as predicted probabilities. The highest 
probabilities of pledge fulfillment are found in single-party governments and there is little 
difference between governments with and without legislative majorities after controlling 
for other relevant variables including government duration. Parties in coalitions are 
generally less likely to fulfill their election pledges. The lowest predicated probability is 
found for pledges made by junior coalition members, which do not hold the chief 
executive. Senior coalition members, which hold the chief executive, are somewhat more 
likely to fulfill their election pledges.  
[Figure 2 about here] 
With the exception of Presidentialism, the institutional variables included in the 
models in Table 2 are insignificant. The US is the only presidential system in the 
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analysis, and the significant negative coefficient indicates that pledges in the US 
presidential system are significantly less likely to be fulfilled than pledges in other 
systems. Semi-presidentialism, bicameralism, federalism and EU membership do not 
have significant effects on pledge fulfillment. Since Portugal is the only semi-presidential 
system in our analysis, the variable Semi-presidentialism is the same as a dummy 
variable for Portugal.  
Regarding the other control variables, the significant effect of financial resources 
is noteworthy. Overall, pledge fulfillment is significantly more likely in times of 
economic growth, although the effect is not consistent throughout the subsets of cases. 
Resources in terms of time also have a positive effect on pledge fulfillment, and we noted 
that minority governments are disproportionately short-lived. With respect to governing 
experience, Models 1 and 2 of Table 2 indicate that parties with no prior experience are 
less likely to fulfill their election pledges than parties that were incumbents when they 
made their election pledges. However, this effect becomes insignificant in the subset of 
coalition cases (Model 2 of Table 3). The coefficients of the other control variables are 
insignificant or not robust. 
Further robustness tests are reported in the Supporting Information. These include 
the following additional tests, among others: 1) models that explore the effect of minority 
governments¶ agreements with non-executive parties or legislators; 2) models applied to 
subsets of cases, such as only the parliamentary cases (excluding the US); 3) models with 
fixed effects for countries; 4) models with an additional categorization of types of 
pledges in a subset of countries; 5) multinomial models with the three-category 
dependent variable; and 6) models with programs as units of analyses, which exclude the 
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variables that vary within programs. The main findings highlighted here are robust to 
these alternative specifications. Our main finding that single-party governments do better 
than coalitions in terms of pledge fulfillment is robust even in a model similar to Model 1 
that includes country fixed effects. This fixed-effects model uses only within-country 
variation and is therefore very demanding given our data. When adding the additional 
controls for Chief executive and other variables to this fixed-effects model, the 
coefficients for Coalition majority and Coalition minority, although still negative, 
become insignificant. This could be due to the lack of sufficient within-country variation 
in these variables. It may also be that the difference between single-party and coalition 
governments is due to the fact that single-party governments by definition hold the chief 
executive. 
 
Conclusions 
We presented the first genuinely comparative study on the fulfillment of election pledges 
across a broad range of countries and institutional settings. The findings concern one of 
the central principles of democratic theory: that parties make promises to voters during 
election campaigns and then fulfill those promises if they enter government office after 
elections (Mansbridge 2003, 515). The evidence shows that parties act according to this 
principle to a considerable extent. Parties that hold executive office after elections 
generally fulfill substantial percentages, sometimes very high percentages, of their 
election pledges, while parties that do not hold executive office generally find that lower 
percentages of their pledges are fulfilled. 
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The fulfillment of pledges by governing executive parties varies across 
governments in ways that partly reflect power-sharing arrangements. The main power-
sharing arrangement that impacts upon pledge fulfillment distinguishes between single-
party governments and coalitions, not between governments with and without legislative 
majorities. We found the highest percentages of pledge fulfillment for governing parties 
in the UK, Sweden, Portugal, Spain and Canada, almost  all of which governed in single-
party executives. We found lower percentages for governing parties in Germany, the 
Netherlands, Austria, Bulgaria, Ireland and Italy, most of which governed in coalitions. 
Pledge fulfillment by US presidential parties lies at the higher end of coalition 
governments. This suggests that US presidents are more constrained than governing 
parties in single-party parliamentary systems, but less constrained than most governing 
parties in multiparty coalitions.  
 Our study provides evidence of the effectiveness of governing parties that do not 
hold legislative majorities. The performance of single-party minority governments is 
noteworthy. Our evidence shows that single-party minority governments generally 
consist of large centrally located parties that control the median legislator, indicating that 
their minority status is a sign of strength rather than weakness (Crombez 1996). This 
accords with previous theoretical and empirical research, which demonstrates that 
minority governments and divided government can work effectively in terms of 
legislative productivity (Strøm 1990; Mayhew 2005). Moreover, we find that negative 
investiture rules, which are associated with longer tenure, are also associated with a 
higher likelihood of pledge fulfillment by parties in minority governments. Future 
research could give more attention to the impact of legislative procedures on the strength 
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of the program-to-policy linkage, particularly in research that includes more minority 
governments with greater variation in legislative rules on government formation and 
termination. 
 Which party controls the chief executive explains some of the variation in pledge 
fulfillment within coalitions. However, some of the evidence indicates that the difference 
between holding and not holding this post is not always large. There is a considerable 
overlap in the probabilities that senior and junior coalition partners fulfill their election 
pledges. It is therefore remarkable that a body of sophisticated theoretical work posits 
that the party of the chief executive has a far higher level of control over policy than do 
its coalition partners (Austen-Smith and Banks 1988; Baron 1991; Huber 1996; 
Diermeier and Feddersen 1998; Thies 2001; Dewan and Hortala-Vallve 2011). Moreover, 
we do not find HYLGHQFHIRUWKHH[SHFWDWLRQWKDWDSDUW\¶VSOHGJHVDUHPRUHOLNHO\WREH
fulfilled if it obtained the relevant ministerial portfolio after the election (cf. Laver and 
Shepsle 1996). Instead, the findings are more in line with theories that highlight 
mechanisms of collective policymaking that constrain ministers (Warwick 1999; 
Dunleavy and Bastow 2001). The findings presented here may encourage theorists to 
further specify models in which the chief executive and relevant ministers feature 
prominently. The advantage of holding these positions may depend on the presence or 
absence of certain mechanisms for interministerial coordination or parliamentary control 
that make chief executives and ministers accountable (e.g. Martin and Vanberg 2004; 
Kassim 2013). We also hope that our study encourages further empirical research using 
the same measures of pledge fulfillment, perhaps expanding the countries and time-
periods covered to include more institutional variation and non-Western democracies. 
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The effects of government type and economic conditions on pledge fulfillment 
indicate that parties do not fully adjust what they promise to the political and economic 
constraints they could expect to encounter in government. If parties did respond 
accurately to such expectations, they would make more modest commitments when they 
expect to enter coalitions or when the economy is weaker, so that the probability of 
pledge fulfillment would be the same, regardless of these conditions. While more modest 
commitments in these conditions would result in higher levels of pledge fulfillment, they 
would not necessarily serve the democratic process well. Parties make pledges not only 
with a view to fulfilling them, but also to serving another two requirements of 
representation: bringing together internal party factions and offering voters choices 
among alternative polices during election campaigns.  
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Tables and figures 
 
Table 1. The 12 countries and 54 governments included 
Single-party executives with legislative majorities (15 governments) 
Bulgaria: 1997-2001, ODS 
Canada: 1993-97, Liberals; 1997-2000, Liberals; 2000-04, Liberals; 2011-15, Conservatives 
Ireland: 1977-81, Fianna Fáil 
Portugal: 2005-09, PS 
Spain: 1989-93, PSOE: 2000-04, PP 
UK: 1974-79, Labour; 1979-83, Conservative; 1983-87, Conservative; 1987-92 Conservative; 
1992-97, Conservative 
United States: 1977-81, Democrats 
 
Single-party executives with legislative minorities (16 governments) 
Bulgaria: 2009-13, GERB 
Canada: 2004-06, Liberals; 2006-08, Conservatives; 2008-11, Conservatives 
Ireland: 1987-89, Fianna Fáil  
Portugal: 1995-99, PS 
Spain: 1993-96, P62(-33 
Sweden: 1994-6RFLDO'HPRFUDWV-6RFLDO'HPRFUDWV-06, Social 
'HPRFUDWV 
United States: 1981-85, Republican; 1985-89, Republican; 1989-93, Republican; 1993-97, 
Democrats; 1997-2001, Democrats 
 
Coalition executives with legislative majorities (20 governments) 
Austria: 2000-03, ÖVP/ FPÖ; 2003-07, ÖVP/ FPÖ; 2007-08, SPÖ/ ÖVP 
Bulgaria: 1995-96, BSP/NS; 2001-05, NDSV/DPS; 2005-%631'69'36Á 
Germany: 2002-05, SPD/ Greens; 2005-09, CDU-CSU/ SPD 
Ireland: 1982-87, Fine Gael/Labour; 1989-92, Fianna Fáil/ Progressive Democrats; 1992-94, 
Fianna Fáil/ Labour; 2002-07, Fianna Fáil/Progressive Democrats; 2007-11, Fianna Fáil/ 
Progressive Democrats/ Greens; 2011-2016, Fine Gael/Labour 
Italy: 2001-%HUOXVFRQL,,¶VFRDOLWLRQ),$1/18'&136,35,Á-11, Berlusconi 
,9¶VFRDOLWLRQ3G//10S$3,'Á 
Netherlands: 1986-89, CDA/ VVD; 1989-94, CDA/ PvdA; 1994-98, PvdA / VVD/ D66 
Sweden: 2006-0RGHUDWH3DUW\&HQWUH3DUW\3HRSOH¶V3DUW\&KULVWLDQ'HPRFUDWVÁ 
 
Coalition executives with legislative minorities (3 governments) 
Ireland: 1997-)LDQQD)iLO3URJUHVVLYH'HPRFUDWV 
Italy: 1996-3URGL,¶V8OLYRFRDOLWLRQ3'633,5,)G98'Á-3URGL,,¶V
coalition Unione (DS/ DL/ PRC/ RnP-PdCI/ IdV/ FdV/ UDEURÁ 
Note: : minority governments that had agreements with one or more opposition parties or 
parliamentarians to maintain support. Dataset does not include opposition parties in Austria and 
Italy. ÁLQFOXGHVSOHGJHVPDGHby pre-election coalitions of parties. 
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Table 2. )DFWRUVDIIHFWLQJH[HFXWLYHJRYHUQLQJSDUWLHV¶SOHGJHIXOILOOPHQW 
  Model 1   Model 2  
 eb b (s.e.) p eb b (s.e.) p 
Government type (reference: single-party majority)      
   Single-party minority  1.46 .37 (.19) .04 1.39 .33 (.19) .08 
   Coalition majority .34 -1.09 (.19) .00 .41 -.90 (.28) .00 
   Coalition minority .28 -1.27 (.37) .00 .28 -1.26 (.45) .01 
Chief executive    1.85 .61 (.15) .00 
Relevant portfolio    1.15 .14 (.17) .42 
Ideological range     1.20 .18 (.20) .36 
Herfindahl index    1.05 .05 (.05) .92 
Presidentialism .36 -1.03 (.40) .01 .38 -.98 (.41) .02 
Semi-presidentialism 1.35 .30 (.37) .43 1.15 .14 (.36) .70 
Bicameralism 1.18 .17 (.24) .48 1.11 .11 (.22) .64 
Federalism 1.12 .11 (.25) .65 .98 -.02 (.24) .92 
EU-member 1.22 .20 (.26) .44 1.17 .16 (.25) .52 
GDP growth 1.12 .11 (.05) .02 1.12 .11 (.05) .01 
Duration in years 1.44 .36 (.07) .00 1.33 .28 (.08) .00 
Governing experience (reference: incumbents)       
   Opposition parties with experience .75 -.29 (.18) .10 .81 -.22 (.18) .24 
   Opposition parties without experience .54 -.62 (.19) .00 .50 -.80 (.21) .00 
Number of pledges (/10) .98 -.02 (.01) .16 .99 -.01 (.01) .25 
Pre-election coalition  2.92 1.07 (.32) .00 2.03 .71 (.33) .03 
Ideological distance to median legislator    1.01 .01 (.18) .96 
Decade (reference: 1970s)      
   1980s .74 -.30 (.31) .32 .78 -.25 (.32) .43 
   1990s .87 -.14 (.32) .67 .92 -.09 (.31) .78 
   2000s .99 -.01 (.29) .98 1.02 .02 (.30) .94 
Sub-set of pledges tested .74 -.31 (.19) .11 .74 -.30 (.20) .14 
Constant .64 -.44 (.41) .28 .40 -.92 (.69) .18 
Log pseudolikelihood  -4408.46   -4375.83  
chi2 (p) 416.98 (.00) 641.95 (.00) 
n pledges (programs) 7,059 (76) 7,059 (76) 
Note: Logit models with dependent variable partially/fully fulfilled=1 and not fulfilled=0. 
Standard errors clustered by program. Countries weighted equally.  
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Table 3. Single-party governments and coalitions examined separately 
 Model 1 
Single-party 
governments 
Model 2 
Coalitions 
 eb b (s.e.) p eb b (s.e.) p 
Government type (reference: majority 
governments of at least 3 years) 
      
   Majority governments of less than 3 years    .78 -.24 (.25) .33 
   Minority governments of less than 3 years .93 -.07 (.32) .83    
   Minority governments of at least 3 years 1.01 .01 (.24) .96 1.21 .19 (.65) .77 
Chief executive    1.59 .46 (.14) .00 
Relevant portfolio    1.13 .12 (.15) .42 
Ideological range     1.40 .33 (.38) .38 
Herfindahl index    .92 -.08 (.54) .87 
Agreement between coalition partners    1.95 .67 (.23) .00 
Presidentialism .43 -.85 (.79) .28    
Semi-presidentialism 1.43 .36 (.67) .59    
Bicameralism .98 -.02 (.65) .98 1.18 .16 (.29) .58 
Federalism .80 -.22 (.62) .72 .90 -.11 (.21) .61 
GDP growth .96 -.04 (.06) .55 1.15 .14 (.08) .07 
Governing experience (reference: 
incumbents) 
      
   Opposition parties with experience .63 -.46 (.33) .16 .78 -.25 (.16) .11 
   Opposition parties without experience .32 -1.14 (.29) .00 .69 -.37 (22) .09 
Number of pledges (/10) .99 -.01 (.02) .75 .99 -.01 (.01) .48 
Pre-election coalition     2.36 .86 (.59) .15 
Ideological distance to median legislator 1.30 .26 (.30) .38 .85 -.16 (.24) .50 
Decade (reference: 1970s for M1;  
1980s for M2) 
     
   1980s .96 -.04 (.38) .92    
   1990s 1.75 .56 (.46) .22 1.24 .22 (.22) .32 
   2000s .97 -.03 (.49) .95 2.00 .70 (.22) .00 
Sub-set of pledges tested .85 -.16 (.36) .66 1.00 .03 (.26) .99 
Constant 3.91 1.36 (.47) .00 .27 -1.32 (.78) .09 
Log pseudolikelihood  -1750.47   -2256.32  
chi2 (p) 102.71 (.00) 776.95 (.00) 
n pledges (programs) 2,946 (31) 3,504 (41) 
Note: Logit models with dependent variable partially/fully fulfilled=1 and not fulfilled=0. 
Standard errors clustered by program. Countries weighted equally. Model 1 contains pledges 
from single-party executives in Bulgaria, Canada, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, UK and US. 
Model 2 contains pledges from coalitions with variation in the variables Chief executive and 
Relevant ministry in Austria, Bulgaria, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands and Sweden. Excludes 
Italy, for which we only have pledges from pre-election coalitions. 
  
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. The fulfillment of election pledges by country and government type 
Note: UK: United Kingdom; PT: Portugal; SE: Sweden; ES: Spain; CA: Canada; DE: Germany; 
US: United States; NL: The Netherlands; BU: Bulgaria; IE: Ireland; AT: Austria; IT: Italy; G: 
Parties that entered government after the elections; O: Parties that entered the opposition after the 
elections. Studies of Austria and Italy do not include pledges made by opposition parties. Sin maj: 
single-party majority governments; Sin min: single-party minority governments. Co maj: majority 
coalitions; Co min: minority coalitions. Numbers above bars refer to the total numbers of pledges 
tested for fulfillment.  
 
  
 
 
Figure 2. The probability of pledge fulfillment by governing party status 
Note: Bars refer to the 95 percent confidence intervals that pledges are at least partially fulfilled.  
³6QUFRDOLWLRQ´UHIHUVWRFRDOLWLRQPHPEHUVWKDWKROGWKHFKLHIH[HFXWLYHSRVW³-QUFRDOLWLRQ
refers to coalition members that do not. The estimates were derived from Model 2 in Table 2. 
Other variables held at their relevant mode (for categorical variables) or mean (for scale 
variables) values.  
 
 
